

FORM 12-62

2024

COMPLETED AS No. 1361/66 DATED 23 JUNE 1966

Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000900260001-8

No. 210-66

Date _____

SUBJECT

The Latest Cyprus Imbroglio

REQUESTED BY : DDI via D/OCI

PURPOSE : Enlightenment

DESIRED LENGTH : _____

SPECIAL DISSEM : Routine internal and external GRAPHICS? _____

COORDINATION
OUTSIDE OCI : _____

ASSIGNED TO : ME Div

DUE DATE: _____

OAD REVIEW : _____

1. O/DCI _____

4. CS/II _____

6. WA _____

7. AA _____

8. _____

2. O/DDI _____

5. DAY/SIDO _____

P/A _____

P/A _____

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SPECIAL CENTER CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		DATE 24 JUNE 1966		OUT NO.	
		PRIORITY	IMMEDIATE	25X1A	
TO:	[REDACTED] 25X1A	ORIGINATOR		[REDACTED]	
INFO:	[REDACTED]	DIVISION		OCI/PRE3	EXTENSION 9400 R
FROM:	CIA/OCI	SOURCE REF.			
TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED					
TO			CITE		
CONFIDENTIAL			SCWASHINGTON		
PRIORITY [REDACTED] 25X1A					
			25X1C		
<p>INTEL MEMO NO. 1314/64 DATED 23 JUNE ENTITLED THE LATEST CYPRUS INDROGLIO MAY HAVE BEEN RELEASED [REDACTED] [REDACTED] THE MEMO MADE THE FOLLOWING OBSER- VATIONS REGARDING RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY MAKARIOS ON THE MOVEMENT OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO AND FROM THE TURKISH SECTOR OF NICOSIA ON 2 JUNE AND AGAIN ON 21 JUNE:</p> <p>1. THESE TACTICS SEEM TO BE PART AND PARCEL OF MAKARIOS' STRATEGY TO ERODE THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS GRADUALLY, TO DESTROY THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE TURKISH MAINLAND LEADERSHIP, AND TO COMPLICATE THE EFFORTS OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A WORKABLE SOLUTION. ANKARA'S REACTION TO THE INCIDENTS THIS WEEK--ITS "ULTIMATUM," WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT FOLLOW-UP-- FURTHER UNDERCUTS THE TURKISH POSITION. THE LOCAL TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN PARTICULAR MAY WELL BE WEAKENED BY WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A</p>					
SIGNATURE OF RELEASING OFFICER		SIGNATURE OF COORDINATING OFFICER		SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	

9

ROUTING				
1		4		7
2				
3		6		9

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
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EDITION

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TO:				ORIGINATOR			
INFO:				DIVISION		EXTENSION	
FROM:				SOURCE REF.			
TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS. DOUBLE SPACED							
TO						CITE	
FILE TWO							
<p>FAILURE OF COORDINATION IS ANKARA BUT MAY LOOK LIKE A FAILURE OF NERVE. MAKARIOS HAS TUES IN ANOTHER ROUND. THE LATEST EPISODES ALSO WILL TEND TO BIND THE TURKISH AND GREEK NEGOTIATORS, WHO PLAN TO RESUME TALKS SOON, THAT THE WILY ARCH-BISHOP MUST BE A PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT BEARING ON THE ISLAND'S FUTURE. THE PROSPECT THIS IS FOR MAKARIOS TO CONTINUE WHITTILING AWAY AT THE TURKISH CYPRIOIS WHILE ANKARA PUNES AND PERIODICALLY CREATES AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BY THREATENING TO INTERVENE. THE DANGER NONETHELESS REMAINS THAT AT SOME POINT TURKEY'S FRUSTRATIONS MAY BECOME OVERWHELMING.</p>							
END OF MESSAGE							
25X1A							
SIGNATURE OF RELEASING OFFICER		SIGNATURE OF COORDINATING OFFICER			SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER		
							

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ROUTING					
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SUBJECT: ~~The Status of the~~

REQUESTED OR ORIGINATED BY: ~~ONE~~

DISSEMINATION: ~~Section 1, 2 and 3 completed on 13 June.~~

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

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23 June 1966

No. 1364/66

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

THE LATEST CYPRUS IMBROGLIO

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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No. 1364/66

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
23 June 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*

The Latest Cyprus Imbroglia

1. The political temperature on Cyprus has risen again. Two blockades of the Turkish sector of Nicosia in the last three weeks appear to be part and parcel of Cyprus President Makarios' strategy to erode the position of the Turkish Cypriots gradually, to destroy their confidence in the Turkish mainland leadership, and to complicate--if not wreck--the efforts of the Greek and Turkish governments to find a workable solution.

2. On 2 June and again on 21 June, Makarios clamped restrictions on the movement of Turkish Cypriots to and from the Turkish sector of Nicosia. He cited bombing incidents in the Greek sector of the city as justification. Some of the bombings may have been the work of Turkish Cypriots, but there is good reason to believe that others were contrived by Greek Cypriot officials. To keep the Greek Government in Athens out of his act, Makarios assigned the implementation of the blockades to his minister of interior, rather than to his old rival, General Grivas, who commands the Cyprus armed forces but is more responsive to Athens.

3. Immediate Turkish Cypriot reaction to the first blockade was relatively mild. Turkish Cypriot judges, however, subsequently withdrew from participation in courts in the Greek sector

*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

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of the city. These courts were one of the few vestiges of official cooperation between the two communities. The judges apparently meant their action to support the aims of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which seeks de facto partition; in effect, however, the withdrawal served to underscore Makarios' argument that it is impossible for the Greeks to work with the Turkish community.

4. Ankara's reaction to the incidents this week--its "ultimatum," without any significant follow-up--further undercuts the Turkish position. The local Turkish Cypriots in particular may well be shaken by what seems to have been a failure of coordination in Ankara but may look like a failure of nerve.

5. Makarios has thus won still another round. The latest episodes also will tend to remind the Turkish and Greek negotiators, who plan to resume talks soon, that the wily archbishop must be a party to any agreement bearing on the island's future. This fact of Cyprus' politics makes it even less likely that Athens and Ankara can work out something politically tolerable at home. The prospect thus is for Makarios to continue whittling away at the Turkish Cypriots while Ankara fumes and periodically creates an international crisis by threatening to intervene. The danger nonetheless remains that at some point Turkey's frustrations may become overwhelming.

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